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Martin Z.P. Olszynski* Environmental Assessment as Planning
and Disclosure Tool: Greepeace
Canada v. Canada (A.G.)
In Greenpeace Canada v. Canada (2014), the applicants successfully challenged
the adequacy of the environmental assessment report prepared in relation to
a proposed nuclear power plant. In assessing that report, the Federal Court
described environmental assessment as an "evidence-based and democratically
accountable" decision-making process. In this comment I suggest that this
characterization represents the most significant-if perhaps also long overdue-
development in Canadian environmental assessment law since the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada. I
also discuss some of the implications of this characterization, including the extent
to which environmental effects must be considered and the proper approach to
judicial review in this context.
Dans Greenpeace Canada c. Canada (2014), les demanderesses ont conteste
avec succ~s le caract~re suffisant du rapport d'6valuation environnementale
concernant un projet de nouvelle centrale nucl6aire. En evaluant ce rapport, la
Cour f~derale ecrit , Iorsqu'il le processus d6cisionnel aux termes de la LCEE]
se deroule correctement, les ddcisions sont prises en fonction des elements
de preuve et r~pondent aux impdratifs d'un syst~me d6mocratique. -Dans
son commentaire, I'auteur avance que cette caract6risation reprdsente le plus
important developpement-tout en rappelant qu'il est sans doute attendu depuis
trop Iongtemps-en droit canadien sur I'valuation environnementale depuis
I'arr6t de la Cour supreme dans Friends of the Oldman River Society c. Canada.
II traite egalement des implications de cette caracterisation, notamment de
I'importance qui doit 6tre accordde aux effets environnementaux et de la fagon
ad6quate d'aborder le contrle judiciaire dans ce contexte.
* Assistant Professor, University of Calgary Faculty of Law.
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Introduction
In Greenpeace Canada v. Canada (A.G.),' the Federal Court allowed
Greenpeace Canada's application for judicial review regarding the Joint
Review Panel report for the Darlington New Nuclear project proposed by
Ontario Power Generation (OPG). 2 In a relatively lengthy decision (431
paragraphs), Russell J. held that the environmental assessment conducted
by the Panel failed to comply with the Canadian EnvironmentalAssessment
Act .(as it then was). Specifically, there were gaps in the Panel's treatment
of hazardous substances emissions and spent nuclear fuel, and a failure
to consider the effects of a severe "common cause" accident, such as the
1. Greenpeace Canada v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 463, 87 CELR (3d) 173 [Greenpeace]. Readers
may be interested to know that all of the respondents-the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission,
Ontario Power Generation and the Attorney General of Canada-have since filed Notices of Appeal of
this decision: John Spears, "OPG appeals court decision on new reactors" The Toronto Star (20 June
2014), online: <www.thestar.com>.
2. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Darlington New Nuclear Power Plant Project
Joint Review Panel Environmental Assessment Report, (Ottawa: CEAA, August 2011), online: <www.
ceaa-acee.gc.ca> [Darlington Panel Report].
3. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37 [CEAA 1992], as repealed by Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52.
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combined earthquake and .tsunami that caused the Fukushima nuclear
disaster.
As noted by the media, while the decision was of limited effect on
a project that at the time had already been indefinitely postponed by the
province, it was "a symbolic blow to an industry coping with the public and
political fallout from Japan's 2011 Fukushima meltdown."4 In this comment,
I suggest that Greenpeace also represents a significant development in
Canadian environmental assessment law and jurisprudence. As further
discussed below, Russell J.'s characterization of the environmental
assessment process as one that is "evidence-based and democratically
accountable"5 is the most important-if also long overdue-judicial
insight in this area since the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark
decision in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of
Transport).6 As Russell J. himself recognized, this characterization has
implications for several other aspects of the environmental assessment
process, including the extent to which environmental effects must be
considered and the proper approach to judicial review in this context.
These, in turn, are directly relevant to several major resource projects
currently making their way through either the regulatory process or the
4. Ian Macleod, "Court decision sidetracks future nuclear reactors for Ontario" Ottawa Citizen (14
May 2014), online: <www.ottawacitizen.com>.
5. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 237.
6. Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 [Friends
of the Oldman River]. It is hard to overstate the impact of this decision, which was released at a
time when Parliament was actually considering a constitutional amendment to give the provinces
primary jurisdiction over the environment. The Supreme Court of Canada not only affirmed the
federal government's constitutional authority to consider the environmental effects of projects with
respect to which it exercises a power or function (in that case, the Oldman River Dam that required
approval under federal navigable waters protection), but also recognized environmental assessment as
an integral component of sound governmental decision-making. Friends of the Oldman River has been
the subject of numerous articles and commentary and continues to play an important role in Canadian
environmental law scholarship to this day, see, e.g., Steven A Kennett, "Federal Environmental
Jurisdiction after Oldman," Case Comment, (1993) 38:1 McGill LJ 180; Jean Leclair, "The Supreme
Court of Canada's Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity" (2003) 28:2
Queen's LJ 411; Jerry V DeMarco, "Law for Future Generations: The Theory of Intergenerational
Equity in Canadian Environmental Law" (2004) 15:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1; Arlene Kwasniak,
"Environmental Assessment, Overlap, Duplication, Harmonization, Equivalency, and Substitution:
Interpretation, Misinterpretation, and a Path Forward" (2009) 20:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1; Marie-Ann
Bowden & Martin ZP Olszynski, "Old Puzzle, New Pieces: Red Chris and Vanadium and the Future
of Federal Environmental Assessment" (2011) 89:2 Can Bar Rev 445.
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courts, including Taseko's proposed New Prosperity mine7 and Enbridge's
Northern Gateway pipeline.8
I. A primer on CEAA 1992
Before considering Russell J.'s decision and its implications, a quick
overview of the federal environmental assessment regime under CEAA
1992 is appropriate. As further discussed in Part III, while this legislation
has since been repealed and replaced by the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act, 20129 and while there are certainly some significant
differences between the two regimes, the provisions central to Russell
J.'s analysis have been carried over largely unchanged.' ° Thus, while
written in the context of CEAA 1992, Greenpeace will be relevant to the
interpretation of CEAA 2012 as well.
Unlike the original federal environmental assessment regime, the
Environmental Assessment and Review Procedures Guidelines Order,"
which applied to both physical works and policies, CEAA 1992 applied
only to "projects" as defined in section 2:
(a) in relation to a physical work, any proposed construction, operation,
modification, decommissioning, abandonment or other undertaking
in relation to that physical work, or
(b) any proposed physical activity not relating to a physical work that is
7. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Report of the Federal Review Panel: New
Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine Project, (Ottawa: CEAA, October 2013), online: <www.ceaa-acee.
gc.ca> [New Prosperity Panel Report]. The New Prosperity Panel concluded that the project is
likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects and the federal government subsequently
determined that these effects were not justified in the circumstances. Taseko, the company proponent,
has filed judicial review applications challenging both the report and the government's decision.
8. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Connections: Report of the Joint Review Panel
for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, vol 1 (Ottawa: CEAA, 2013), Canadian Environmental
Assessment Agency, Considerations: Report of the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern
Gatevay Project, vol 2 (Ottawa: CEAA, 2013), online: <www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca> [Northern Gateway
Panel Report]. Like the New Prosperity Panel, the Northem Gateway Panel concluded that the project
was likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects but recommended that these were
justified in the circumstances. There are currently several judicial review applications challenging
both the report and the government's response, most of which have been filed by environmental or
First Nations groups.
9. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19 [CEAA 2012], repealing CEAA
1992, supra note 3.
10. In this part, I have identified in the footnotes the CEAA 2012 equivalent to the CEAA 1992
provision being discussed.
11. Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84-467 [EARPGO].
This was the regime considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Friends of the Oldman River,
supra note 6.
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prescribed.. .pursuant to regulations made under paragraph 59(b)12
The starting point under CEAA 1992 was section 5, which set out the
circumstances under which an environmental assessment would be
required. Where the federal government was (a) the proponent, (b) a
financier, (c) a landowner, or (d) a regulator, the relevant department
or agency, referred to as a "responsible authority" under the act, had to
ensure that an environmental assessment was completed before exercising
the power or function that triggered the assessment in the first place. 3
The last category, pursuant to which the vast majority of environmental
assessments were triggered, came to be known as the "Law List Trigger,"
so called after the regulation that listed the various federal regulatory
approvals and permits that required an environmental assessment. 14
The next step was to determine the kind of assessment that the project
would be subjected to.' 5 The presumptive track was a "screening"' 16
unless the proposed project was described on the Comprehensive Study
List Regulations,7 in which case a comprehensive study-generally
understood as a more rigorous assessment-would be required. Where
a responsible authority was of the view that public concern warranted an
independent panel review, they could also refer the project to the Minister
of the Environment who would then appoint such a panel. ' More often than
12. Section 2 of CEAA 2012, supra note 9, refers to "designated project[s]," defined as "one or
more physical activities that (a) are carried out in Canada or on federal lands; (b) are designated
by regulations made under paragraph 84(a) or designated in an order made by the Minister under
subsection 14(2); and (c) are linked to the same federal authority as specified in those regulations or
that order." This definition forms part of one of the most significant differences between CEAA 1992
and CEAA 2012, which is the move away from a "trigger" approach to a "project list," as further
explained in the next note.
13. For CEAA 1992, supra note 3, see ss 5, 11(2). For CEAA 2012, supra note 9, see ss 7, 8. Thus,
under CEAA 1992, environmental assessment was primarily triggered by the exercise of a federal
power (s 5) with only a residual discretionary power to assess projects that did not require federal
action but nevertheless were likely to have an effect on federal areas of jurisdiction (see s 48). Under
CEAA 2012, the triggering event is inclusion of a "designated project" on the Regulations Designating
Physical Activities, SOR/2012-147 [Regulations Designating Physical Activities]. The manner in
which projects make their way onto this list is entirely discretionary, and they may or may not require
any other involvement (e.g., permit, funding) by the federal government.
14. Lcmv List Regulations, SOR/94-636 [Law List Regulations].
15. Miningwatch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 SCR 6
[Miningwatch Canada].
16. CEAA 1992, supra note 3, s 18. These were the least demanding form of EA, although they
were still considered actual environmental assessments. CEAA 2012, supra note 9 also refers to
"screenings," but these are no longer assessments but rather true screenings intended to inform the
decision as to whether a proper environmental assessment will actually be required; see s 10.
17. Comprehensive Study List Regulations, SOR/94-638 [CSL]. While the manner in which projects
find their way to the Regulations Designating Physical Activities under CEAA 2012 (supra notes 13,
9) is largely discretionary, most projects on the CSL were brought over to that regulation.
18. For CEAA 1992, supra note 3, see s 25(b). For CEAA 2012, supra note 9, see s 38.
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not, such panels were struck in conjunction with any other federal (e.g.,
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission in Greenpeace) or provincial
authority (e.g., Alberta's Energy Resources Conservation Board, now the
Alberta Energy Regulator) that also had a responsibility for assessing
the environmental effects of the proposed project. Such panels were then
referred to as joint review panels.
Irrespective of track, all environmental assessments under CEAA 1992
had to include a consideration of the following factors:
16.(1)... (a) the environmental effects of the project, including the
environmental effects of malfunctions or accidents
that may :occur in connection with the project and any
cumulative environmental effects that are likely to result
from the project in combination with other projects' or
activities that have been or will be carried out;
(b) the significance of the effects referred to in paragraph (a);
(c) comments from the public that are received in accordance
with this Act and the regulations;
(d) measures that are technically and economically feasible and
that would mitigate any significant adverse environmental
effects of the project; and
(e) any other matter... that the responsible authority or, except
in the case of a screening, the Minister after consulting with
the responsible authority, may require to be considered. 9
A review panel's specific obligations were set out in section 34:
A review panel shall, in accordance with any regulations made for that
purpose and with its term of reference,
(a) ensure that the information required for an assessment by a
review panel is obtained and made available to the public;
(b) hold hearings in a manner that offers the public an
opportunity to participate in the assessment;
(c) prepare a report setting out
(i) the rationale, conclusions and recommendations of
the panel relating to the environmental assessment
of the project, including any mitigation measures and
follow-up program, and
(ii) a summary of any comments received from the public;
and
(d) submit the report to the Minister and the responsible
authority.20
19. For CEAA 2012, supra note 9, see s 19.
20. Ibid, s 43(1).
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If a panel concluded that the proposed project was not likely to result in
significant adverse environmental effects, the responsible authority could
go ahead and exercise the federal power that triggered the application of
the Act in the first place. On the other hand, if a panel concluded that
significant adverse environmental effects were likely then a responsible
authority could only proceed if the Governor in Council determined that
such effects were "justified in the circumstances." 2'
II. The decision
1. The facts
In the fall of 2006 and under direction from the Ontario Minister of Energy,
OPG applied to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) for a
site preparation license for several new reactors at its existing Darlington
nuclear plant in Bowmanville, Ontario. OPG's application for this license,
as well as for authorizations under the federal Fisheries Act2 2 and the
Navigable Waters Protection Act 23 triggered the application of CEAA 1992
by virtue of the above-noted Law List Regulations. The project was referred
to ajoint review panel in 2008 and a three-member panel was appointed in
2009. Following 284 information requests and seventeen days of hearings
in the spring of 2011, the Panel submitted its final report to the Minister
in August of that year, concluding that the project was not likely to result
in significant adverse environmental effects. The applicants challenged
the adequacy of the environmental assessment and the Darlington Panel
Report shortly thereafter.
2. The issues
The application for judicial review raised issues regarding the CEAA
1992, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act24 and procedural fairness. This
comment is concerned only with those issues relevant to the CEAA 1992,
which Russell J. summarized as follows:
(a) Did the Panel fail to comply with the requirements of the CEAA in
conducting the EA by:
i. Failing to conduct an environmental assessment of a "project"
as defined in the Act;
ii. Failing to consider the "environmental effects" of the Project as
required by s. 16 of the Act;
21. CEAA 1992, supra note 3, s 37. For CEAA 2012, supra note 9, see ss 52, 53.
22. Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14.
23. Navigable Waters Protection Act, RSC 1985, c N-22, now the Navigation Protection Act, RSC
1985, c N-22.
24. Nuclear Safety and Control Act, SC 1997, c 9.
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iii. Failing to assess the need for, and alternatives to, the Project as
required by the Act and the Panel's Terms of Reference;
iv. Failing to fulfill its information gathering, public consultation
and reporting duties under s. 34 of the CEAA; or
v. Unlawfully delegating its duties under the Act?25
3. The applicable standard of review
Russell J. began his analysis with the rule from Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick26 that where the jurisprudence has already established the
appropriate standard there is no need to engage a full standard of review
analysis. With respect to CEAA 1992, the jurisprudence had been more
or less settled for over a decade that questions of law are reviewable on
the correctness standard, whereas the reasonableness standard applies to a
panel's weighing of evidence and substantive conclusions based thereon.27
In Russell J.'s view, however, this case law was "inconsistent with new
developments in the common law principles of judicial review," such that
he was required to undertake anew the standard of review analysis. 28
The "new development" that appears to have influenced Russell J.
most here was the Supreme Court's recent re-affirmation of the principle
(and associated presumption) that "an administrative decision-maker
interpreting its home statute or a closely related statute is entitled to
deference.129 Although he acknowledged that "questions of law could
arise under the CEAA or its successor legislation in relation to which.. .the
presumption of reasonableness review would be rebutted" in his view no
such questions arose here.3" Although there was "an element of statutory
interpretation involved in answering [the] issues, each is also a question
of mixed fact and law that engages the expertise and judgment of the
Panel."'" As such, the applicable standard was reasonableness.3 2
4. The arguments
Russell J. summarized the applicants' primary arguments:
As identified in the Report, the Panel itself found that key information
about the proposed Project was absent from the EA documentation. For
25. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 19.
26. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
27. Greenpeace, supra note 1 at para 25.
28. Ibid at para 20; see also Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013
SCC 36 at para 48, [2013] 2 SCR 559.
29. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 27, citing McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission),
2013 SCC 67 at paras 21-22, [2013] 3 SCR 895.
30. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 28.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid at para 30, citing Grand Riverkeeper, Labrador Inc v Canada (AG), 2012 FC 1520 at para
62, 2009 CarswellNat 4999 (WL Can).
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example, the Panel found that no specific nuclear reactor technology, site
design layout, cooling water option, used nuclear fuel storage option, or
radioactive waste management option has been selected. Thus, at the
present time, federal decision-makers still do not know: (a) the particulars
of the specific project to be implemented at the Darlington site; (b) the
full range of site-specific or cumulative environmental effects; or (c)
whether there are feasible mitigation measures over the project's full
lifecycle. These and other fundamental gaps are attributable to the fact
that what the Panel had before it was not a "project," but merely a plan
for fitture planning, assessment, and decision-making.33
The reason that so many project components remained unspecified was
that OPG, with the Panel's blessing, had prepared its environmental impact
statement based on a "plant parameter envelope" (PPE) or "bounding
scenario" approach. As described by OPG, "this approach involves
identifying the salient design elements of the Project. and, for each of
those elements, applying the 'limiting value' (the value with the greatest
potential to result in an adverse environmental effect) based on the design
options being considered."34
The respondents' primary argument was that such an approach was
consistent with the requirement, pursuant to section 11 of the CEAA
1992, to conduct the assessment "as early as practicable in the planning
process and before irrevocable decisions are made,"3 5 and further that it
was supported by the case law.36 With respect to the allegation of unlawful
delegation, what the applicants described as "a plan for future planning,
assessment, and decision-making,"37 the respondents relied especially
on the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Alberta Wilderness Assn. v.
Express Pipelines Ltd.:
Finally, we were asked to find that the panel had improperly delegated
some of its functions when it recommended that certain further studies
and ongoing reports to the National Energy Board should be made
before, during and after construction. This argument misconceives
the panel's function which is simply one of information gathering
and recommending. The panel's view that the evidence before it was
adequate to allow it to complete that function "as early as is practicable
in the planning stages.. .and before irrevocable decisions are made" (see
section 11(1)) is one with which we will not lightly interfere. By its
nature the panel's exercise is predictive and it is not surprising that the
33. Greenpeace, supra note 1 at para 127 [emphasis added]. For the fill list of alleged gaps and
deficiencies, see also ibid at paras 218-220.
34. Ibidatpara5.
35. Ibidatpara66.
36. lbidat paras 69-74.
37. Ibidatpara 125.
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statute specifically envisages the possibility of "follow up" programmes.
Indeed, given the nature of the task we suspect that finality and certainty
in environmental assessment can never be achieved."
5. Russell J. 's analysis
Having set out the parties' arguments, Russell J. then undertook a thorough
review of the statutory regime, jurisprudence and associated principles.3 9
Here, Russell J. appeared most influenced by the Federal Court of
Appeal's decision in Express Pipelines, but also by the judgment of Justice
Tremblay-Lamer in Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v.
Canada (A. G.), 4 ° wherein the precautionary principle and the concept
of adaptive management were described as "guiding tenets" in CEAA's
application and interpretation.4 The Court in Pembina Institute described
these concepts as essentially off-setting one another, building on an earlier
Federal Court of Appeal decision-Canadian Parks and Wilderness
Society v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) :42
Evans J.A. stated that "[t]he concept of "adaptive management" responds
to the difficulty, or impossibility, of predicting all the environmental
consequences of a project on the basis of existing knowledge" and
indicated that adaptive management counters the potentially paralyzing
effects of the precautionary principle. Thus, in my opinion, adaptive
management permits projects with uncertain, yet potentially adverse
environmental impacts to proceed based on flexible management
strategies capable of adjusting to new information regarding adverse
environmental impacts where sufficient information regarding those,
impacts and potential mitigation measures already exists.43
Bearing in mind these and other principles, Russell J. concluded that there
was nothing that precluded the adoption of the PPE approach per se.44
First, the theory behind the PPE approach was logical: "if the maximum
effect [of] each component can be adequately mitigated, then the lesser
impacts of the other alternative technology options can also be adequately
38. Alberta Wilderness Assn v Express Pipelines Ltd (1996), 137 DLR (4th) 177 (FCA) at para
14 [Express Pipelines]. The respondents also invoked the concept of adaptive management (see
Greenpeace, supra note I at para 83); this aspect of the decision is further discussed in Part IV.
39. Greenpeace, supra note 1 at paras 108-123, 186-200.
40. Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada (AG), 2008 FC 302, 35 CELR (3d)
254 [Pembina Institute].
41. Ibidatpara33.
42. Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2003 FCA
197 at para 24, 1 CELR (3d) 20 [CPA WS].
43. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 190, citing Evans JA in CPA WS, supra note 42 at para 24.
44. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 181.
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mitigated."45 Second, the Panel concluded that it allowed the assessment of
"the potential environmental impact of all of the potential reactor designs
and configurations put forward by OPG" and the applicants had failed
in Russell J.'s view to establish that this conclusion was unreasonable.
46
Finally, it was also consistent with the jurisprudence: "the issue is not
whether a project is at the concept stage or at a more specific design stage,
but whether a project is at a stage when its environmental impact can be
fully considered.
47
Russell J. did, however, find inadequacies with the Panel's treatment
of three specific issues under this approach:
" The alleged failure of the Panel to insist on a bounding scenario
analysis for hazardous substance emissions, in particular liquid
effluent and stormwater runoff to the surface water environment,
and for the sources, types and quantities of non-radioactive wastes
to be generated by the project;
" The Panel's treatment of the issue of radioactive waste management;
and
• The Panel's conclusion that an analysis of the effects of a severe
common cause accident at the facility was not required at this
stage, but should be carried out prior to construction.48
In assessing these matters, Russell J. accepted the applicants' argument-
unchallenged by the respondents and supported by Pembina Institute in
particular-that the environmental assessment process is fundamentally
different from future licensing or regulatory processes 49 and that there is
therefore a limit to the extent to which the consideration of environmental
effects and their mitigation can be left, or delegated, to those later processes:
Under the CEAA, the ultimate decision-maker for projects referred to
review panels is the Governor in Council (in practical terms, the federal
Cabinet), which decides whether the responsible authorities will be
permitted to take steps to enable the project to move forward. Parliament
chose to allocate this decision to elected officials who are accountable to
Parliament itself and, ultimately, to the electorate....
The most important role for a review panel is to provide an evidentiary
basis for decisions that must be taken by Cabinet and responsible
authorities. The jurisprudence establishes that gathering, disclosing,
45. Ibidat para 182.
46. Ibid at paras 182-184.
47. bidatpara 184.
48. Ibid at para 228.
49. Ibid at para 230.
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and holding hearings to assemble and assess this evidentiary foundation
is an independent duty of a review panel, and failure to discharge it
undermines the ability of the Cabinet and responsible authorities to
discharge their own duties under the Act [citing Pembina Institute at
paras 72-74]....
In short, Parliament has designed a decision-making process under
the CEAA that is, when it functions properly, both evidence-based and
democratically accountable. The CNSC, in considering future licensing
decisions, will be in a fundamentally different position from the Panel
that has conducted the EA. The CNSC will be the final authority
making the decision, not merely an expert panel. Although the CNSC
approaches this role with considerable expertise, it does not have the
same democratic legitimacy and responsibility as the federal Cabinet.5 0
With respect to OPG's PPE approach, which even the Panel acknowledged
was a departure from typical practice, this meant that it "was incumbent
on the Panel to ensure the methodology was fully carried out,"'" bearing
in mind also the challenges that such an approach poses for public
participation: "The less specific the information provided...the more
difficult it may be for interested parties to challenge assumptions, test the
scientific evidence, identify gaps in the analysis, and ensure their interests
are fully considered. 52
Applying this standard to hazardous substance emissions and on-
site chemical inventories, Russell J. concluded that the environmental
assessment came up short. He noted Environment Canada's submissions
to the Panel that, notwithstanding several information requests to OPG,
the remaining gaps prevented the department from assessing effects with
respect to effluent and storm water management.53 The Panel itself noted
that "OPG did not undertake a detailed assessment of the effects of liquid
effluent and storm water runoff to the surface water environment" but that
it "committed to managing liquid effluent releases in compliance with
applicable regulatory requirements and to applying best management
practices for storm water."54 On this basis, the Panel concluded that
the project was not likely to result in significant adverse environmental
effects. Russell J. held that while such a conclusion may be reasonable, it
did not comply with CEAA 1992:
To repeat what is stated above, because of its unique role in the statutory
50. Ibid at paras 232-237 [emphasis added].
51. Ibid at para 247.
52. Ibid at paras 247, 249.
53. Ibid at paras 257-259.
54. Ibid at paras 264-265.
Environmental Assessment as Planning and Disclosure Tool: 219
Greenpeace v. Canada (A. G.)
scheme, a review panel is required to do more than consider the evidence
and reach a reasonable conclusion. It must provide sufficient analysis
and justification to allow the s. 37 decision-makers to do the same,
based on a broader range of scientific and public policy considerations.
One could say that the element of 'justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process" (Dunsmuir, above, at
para 47; Khosa, above, at para 59) takes on a heightened importance in
this context.
In this case, there are references to commitments by OPG to comply
with unspecified legal and regulatory requirements or applicable
quality standards, and to apply good management practices. There are
references to instruments that may or may not contain relevant standards
or thresholds based on the information before the Court (e.g., the
Ontario Stormwater Management Planning and Design Manual (March
2003)). And there are references to thresholds or standards in statutory
instruments (e.g., Fisheries Act, Canadian Environmental Protection
Act) without specific information about how these are relevant to or will
bound or control the Project's effects....
In essence, the Panel takes a short-cut by skipping over the assessment
of effects, and proceeding directly to consider mitigation, which relates
to their significance or their likelihood. This is contrary to the approach
the Panel says it has adopted (see EA Report at p. 39), and makes it
questionable whether the Panel has considered the Project's effects at all
in this regard. 5
This is not to suggest that future regulatory processes "have no role to
play in managing and mitigating a project's environmental effects. '5 6 For
Russell J., a conceptual distinction can be made between two kinds of
situations where a panel, despite some uncertainty, might conclude that
significant adverse environmental effects are unlikely:
(a) Reliance upon an established standard or practice and the likelihood
that the relevant regulatory structures will ensure compliance with
it; or
(b) Confidence in the ability of regulatory structures to manage the
effects of the Project over time. 7
The latter approach is problematic in that it "may short-circuit the two-
stage process whereby an expert body evaluates the evidence regarding a
project's likely effects, and political decision-makers evaluate whether that
55. Ibid at paras 272-275 [emphasis added; citations omitted].
56. lbidatpara241.
57. Ibid at para 280 [emphasis added].
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level of impact is acceptable in light of policy considerations, including
'society's chosen level of protection against risk."' 58
Turning next to the issue of spent nuclear fuel, there does not appear to
have been any real dispute between the parties that the Panel's treatment of
this issue was cursory. Rather, OPG's position was that this was something
that Canada had mandated the Nuclear Waste Management Organization
(NWMO) to study. Russell J. disagreed:
In my view, the record confirms that the issue of the long-term
management and disposal of the spent nuclear fuel to be generated by
the Project has not received adequate consideration. The separate federal
approvals process for any potential NWMO facility, which has not yet
begun... will presumably ensure that such a facility is not constructed if
it does not ensure safety and environmental protection. But a decision
about the creation of that waste is an aspect of the Project that should
be placed before the s. 37 decision-makers with the benefit of a proper
record regarding how it will be managed over the long-term, and what is
known and not known in that regard. 59
According to Russell J., the management and storage of spent nuclear fuel
was not a "separate issue."6 Rather, the environmental assessment "is the
only occasion... on which political decision-makers at the federal level
will be asked to decide whether that waste should be generated in the first
place."'6 Nor was there anything in the Terms of Reference that suggested
that this issue was not to be addressed. 62
Finally, with respect to a severe "common cause" accident, the problem
was not that OPG failed to assess the risks of accidents associated with its
new build but rather that it failed to assess these risks in conjunction with
the existing Darlington plant. 63 The Panel itself recognized this gap and
recommended that OPG "evaluate the cumulative effect of a common-
cause severe accident involving all of the nuclear reactors in the site study
area" prior to construction.' For Russell J., however, that was insufficient:
In my view, the one conclusion that is not supported by the language
of the statute is the Panel's conclusion that the analysis had to be
conducted, but could be deferred until later. Rather, in my view, it had
to be conducted as part of the EA so that it could be considered by those
58. Ibid at para 281.
59. Ibid at para 297.
60. Ibid at para 312.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibidatpara313.
63. Ibid at para 327.
64. See Darlington Panel Report, supra note 2, Recommendation # 63 at 133.
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with political decision-making power in relation to the Project.65
In light of these three deficiencies, and as was the case in Pembina Institute,
the Court remitted the Report to the JRP for further consideration, pending
which the relevant government agencies have no jurisdiction to approve
the project.
III. Discussion
As noted at the outset, although the Greenpeace decision was written in
the context of the now repealed CEAA 1992, all of the provisions relevant
to Russell J.'s analysis-the factors to be considered in an environmental
assessment, a panel's duties, and the political nature of decision-making-
were carried over to CEAA 2012 relatively unchanged.66 Consequently,
Russell J.'s characterization of the environmental assessment process
as one that is evidence based and democratically accountable and the
implications of that characterization for the assessment of environmental
effects and the correct approach to judicial review in this context are as
applicable to CEAA 2012 as they were to CEAA 1992.
1. An evidence-based and democratically accountable decision-making
process
In one of the most cited passages from the Supreme Court of Canada's
Friends ofthe Oldman River decision, La Forest J. described environmental
assessment as follows:
Environmental impact assessment is, in its simplest form, a planning
tool that is now generally regarded as an integral component of sound
decision-making...
As a planning tool it has both an information-gathering and a decision-
making component which provide the decision maker with an objective
basis for granting or denying approval for a proposed development ....
In short, environmental impact assessment is simply descriptive of a
65. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 334.
66. See supra notes 19-21. The only major difference in these provisions is that CEAA 2012,
supra note 9 restricts the definition of "environmental effects" to those that fall under Parliament's
legislative authority (s 5). This definition informs the factors that an environmental assessment must
consider pursuant to s 19 of CEAA 2012, but does not have any bearing on Russell J's analysis that
environmental effects must actually be considered.
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process of decision-making. 67
The most significant, if also long overdue, development coming out of
Greenpeace is Russell J.'s recognition that environmental assessment is
an information-gathering tool not just for governments but also-and just
as importantly-for the public, which relies on such assessments to form
its own views about the desirability (or not) of certain projects and which
can then hold governments accountable for decisions that it does or does
not agree with.
This aspect of the environmental assessment process is clear from the
statutory scheme. As noted by the Court in Pembina Institute, there is no
substantive legal barrier in either CEAA 1992 or CEAA 2012 to prevent the
federal government from granting approvals to projects that are likely to
result in significant adverse environmental effects. 68 This is consistent with
legislation (both versions) the purpose of which is to ensure that projects
are "considered in a careful and precautionary manner" and "to encourage
federal authorities to take actions that promote sustainable development,"
without actually requiring that they meet any substantive standard.69 The
only barrier for projects considered likely to result in significant adverse
environmental effects is a procedural one: cabinet must conclude that such
effects are "justified in the circumstances."70
In other words-assuming that the process has been adequately
followed-there is no legal remedy available to members of the public
who may oppose such projects. Democratic accountability, on the other
hand, is supported in several ways, including the establishment of the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Registry, the purpose of which is to
facilitate "public access to records relating to environmental assessments
and providing notice in a timely manner of those assessments," and which
"must be operated in a manner that ensures convenient public access
to it."'" Indeed, under CEAA 2012 it is the Minister's opinion that an
67. Friends of the Oldman River, supra note 6 at 71. See, e.g., Mining Watch Canada, supra note 15;
Pembina Institute, supra note 40, Friends of the West Country Assn v Canada (Minister of Fisheries
and Oceans), [1998] 4 FC 340 (TD); Manitoba's Future Forest Alliance v Canada (Minister of The
Environment), (1999) 30 CELR (NS) I (FCTD); Western Copper Corp v Yukon Water Board, 2011
YKSC 16, 57 CELR (3d) 46; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment
Director), 2000 BCSC 1001, 34 CELR (NS) 209, aff'd 2002 BCCA 59, 211 DLR (4th) 89.
68. Pembina Institute, supra note 40 at para 27.
69. CEAA 2012, supra note 9, see ss 4(b), (h) [emphasis added]; see also CEAA 1992, supra note 3,
ss 4(a), (b).
70. For CEAA 1992, supra note 3, sees 37; for CEAA 2012, supra note 9, sees 52. The Federal Court
of Appeal recently described what judicial review of such a justification entails; see Council of the
Innu of Ekuanitshit v Canada (AG), 2014 FCA 189 at para 40, 376 DLR (4th) 348.
71. CEAA 2012, supra note 9, s 78; see also ss 79-82; CEAA 1992, supra note 3, ss 55-55.6.
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assessment by a review panel "is in the public interest," a determination
that must include a consideration of any "public concerns related to the
significant adverse environmental effects that the designated project may
cause," that triggers such panels in the first place.
72
Of course, these provisions also enable and reflect the value placed
on public participation in the environmental assessment itself but that
does not detract from their role in supporting democratic accountability,
Parliament's preference for which is also reflected in the Hansard. On
16 March 1992, for example, parliamentarians discussed an opposition
amendment that would have inserted a substantive standard into the
CEAA by explicitly restricting the availability of the "justified in
the circumstances" provision to projects consistent with sustainable
development (i.e., "justified in the circumstances because the project
contributes to the goal of sustainable development").73 The amendment was
defeated. According to the Hon. Lee Clark, then Parliamentary Secretary
to the Minister of the Environment, this would "give the courts more of
a role...than we would think is advisable."74 For Clark, it was "clear that
politicians, elected representatives, are in the best position to accept this
responsibility today, rather than to pass the buck, the responsibility, on
to the courts. '75 This is precisely the conclusion reached by Russell J.:
"Parliament chose to allocate this decision [about whether projects can
proceed] to elected officials who are accountable to Parliament itself and,
ultimately, to the electorate. 76
Political accountability was also explicitly contemplated during the
passage of what is widely accepted as the progenitor of all environmental
assessment laws, including CEAA 77 -the United States' National
Environmental Policy Act.7" NEPA has long been understood as having two
primary aims: "to force agencies to consider the environmental effects of
their actions and to provide a means to involve and inform the public in
federal agency decision-making."79 As the Supreme Court of the United
72. CEAA 2012, supra note 9, ss 38(l), (2).
73. House of Commons Debates, 34th Parl, 3rd Sess, vol 7 (16 March 1992) at 8291 (Hon Chas L
Caccia).
74. House of Commons Debates, 34th Parl, 3rd Sess, vol 7 (16 March 1992) at 8302 (Hon Lee
Clark).
75. Ibid.
76. Greenpeace, supra note 1 at para 232.
77. Ted Schrecker, "The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act: Tremulous Step Forward, or
Retreat into Smoke and Mirrors?" (1991) 5 CELR (NS) 192.
78. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC § 4321 [NEPAl.
79. Courtney A Schultz, "History of the Cumulative Effects Analysis Requirement Under NEPA and
Its Interpretation in U.S. Forest Service Case Law" (2012) 27:1 J Envtl L & Litig 125 at 126 citing
Robertson, infra note 80.
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States put it in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, "NEPA
merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action. ' 80
According to Bradley Karkkainen,
The logic and legislative history of this scheme suggest that NEPA's
authors expected the resulting public scrutiny to act as an independent
constraint on agency discretion. For example, Senator Henry M. "Scoop"
Jackson (D-WA), NEPA's principal sponsor in the Senate, argued that
public disclosure would lead to political accountability that would
compel agency managers to curb their most environmentally destructive
practices.8
In fact, the potential for political accountability is an integral component
of most environmental laws. Under the Species at Risk Act, for example, a
scientific body makes public recommendations with respect to the listing
of species but the ultimate decision lies with Cabinet, with the important
caveat that it must provide reasons where its decision is inconsistent
with those recommendations. 2 Comparing this "constrained discretion"
approach with endangered species legislation where there is no such
requirement, Stewart Elgie has observed a statistically higher listing rate
under SARA. 83 This is consistent with Evans J.A.'s observation in CPA WS,
there with respect to the Canada National Parks Act, that "the political
accountability of ministers to the public, both through Parliament and more
directly, tends to be more effective when a minister's action engages with
competing public interests than when it primarily concerns the interests of
an individual. 84
Environmental laws are primarily concerned with matters of public
interest: air, land, water and the development of natural resources. And while
Canadian scholarship has long recognized this aspect of the environmental
80. Robertson v Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332 (9th Cir 1989) [Roberston]. The full
quote is at 350-351:
The sweeping policy goals announced in.. .NEPA are thus realized through a set of 'action-
forcing' procedures that require that agencies take a 'hard look' at environmental consequences,
and that provide for broad dissemination of relevant environmental information. Although
these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive decision, it is now
well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process... .Other statutes may impose substantive environmental obligations on
federal agencies, but NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action
[emphasis added, citations omitted].
81. Bradley C Karkkainen, "Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's
Environmental Performance" (2002) 102:4 Colum L Rev 903 at 912 [emphasis added].
82. Species at Risk Act, SC 2002, c 29, s 27 [SARA].
83. Stewart Elgie, "Statutory Structure and Species Survival: How Constraints on Cabinet Discretion
Affect Endangered Species Listing Outcomes" (2008) 19:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1.
84. CPA WS, supra note 42 at para 75 [emphasis added].
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assessment process, until Greenpeace it was virtually ignored by courts.85
Post-Greenpeace, then, environmental assessment under CEAA should be
understood as both a planning and disclosure tool, characterized by the
objective and transparent gathering of information ("evidence-based")
followed by political decision-making ("democratically accountable").
2. Failure to assess environmental effects "short-circuits" the CEAA
regime
If the evidence-based, democratically accountable nature of the
environmental assessment process is the most important insight into the
CEAA regime since Friends of the Oldman River, the most important
practical consequence may be that panels must do the work of assessing
potential environmental effects and their mitigation.
At the level of statutory interpretation, Meinhard Doelle has rightly
observed that Greenpeace is about "the tension between the requirement
in section 11 (1) of CEAA 1992 to ensure that an EA is conducted as 'early
as practicable'...and the obligations of the Panel to ensure that the 16(1)
and (2) factors are given meaningful consideration," '86 a tension also
reflected in environmental assessment theory.87 On a pragmatic level,
however, this tension appears to be between two competing interests, the
proponent's (usually a private party) and the public's. Proponents, perhaps
understandably, would prefer to minimize the costs of environmental
assessment in the context of a process whose end result is uncertain,
especially where major and contentious projects such as Darlington, New
85. See, e.g., Schrecker, supra note 77, Bowden & Olszynski, supra note 6 at 480-484. The author
was not able to locate a single case that recognized-let alone discussed-this aspect of environmental
assessment prior to Greenpeace. The closest decision is Pembina Institute, supra note 40, which
recognized that there was a difference between a panel's duties and the government's ultimate decision
(at para 74):
The assessment of the environmental effects of a project and of the proposed mitigation
measures occur outside the realm of government policy debate, which by its very nature
must take into account a wide array of viewpoints and additional factors that are necessarily
excluded by the Panel's focus on project related environmental impacts. In contrast... it is the
final decision-maker that is mandated to take into account the wider public policy factors in
granting project approval.
86. Meinhard Doelle, "Federal Court Ruling on Darlington Nuclear Project" (27 May 2014), Marine
and Environmental Lav News (blog), online: <https://blogs.dal.ca/melaw/2014/05/27/federal-court-
ruling-on-darlington-project/>.
87. See, e.g., Robert Gibson et al, "Strengthening Strategic Environmental Assessment in Canada:
An Evaluation of Three Basic Options" (2010) 20:3 J Envtl L & Prac 175 at 179 (arguing in favor
of strategic or regional environmental assessments because project-based assessments "are usually
too narrowly mandated and come too late in decision-making to be generally effective vehicles for
examining strategic concerns and options").
226 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Prosperity and Northern Gateway are concerned.88 These proponents
generally appear much more willing to do additional studies once they
have the regulatory certainty of government approval.8 9 The public interest
at stake is the public's ability to participate meaningfully in the process,
which Russell J. recognized is hindered where information is missing or
not sufficiently detailed.9"
In true Solomonic fashion, Russell J. resolved the statutory "tension"
by finding the PPE approach permissible under the Act while at the same
time requiring that it be "fully carried out."'" For Russell J., this obligation
was not met where information on potential environmental effects was
missing and the Panel appeared to rely instead on proponent commitments
to manage effects in compliance with applicable but often unspecified
regulatory requirements.
In addition to enabling public participation and democratic
accountability (and virtually guaranteeing that few proponents will adopt
an "envelope" approach going forward), this finding speaks to one of the
greatest misconceptions of Canadian environmental law, one that was
reflected during CEAA 1992's brief parliamentary review. I am referring
to the notion that environmental assessment is somehow superfluous;
that there already exists a vast, detailed and protective environmental
88. The fact that environmental assessment can be costly is widely understood: see, e.g., House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, Statutory Review of
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act: Protecting The Environment, Managing Our Resources:
Report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (March 2012) at 3-4
(Chair: Mark Warawa):
Because of the time, amount, and the human resources required to move something through
the CEAA process, [some] companies simply say that they decided not to do something
because it just wasn't worth entering the approvals process. Time and money are important.
So they just move on or leave things until they absolutely have to change something and
it becomes precipitous (quoting Mark Wittrup, Saskatchewan's Assistant Deputy Minister,
Environmental Protection and Audit Division, Ministry of Environment).
89. See, e.g., Enbridge's Northern Gateway site, wherein the company states that it "will continue
to work hard towards meeting the [209] conditions set out by the National Energy Board (Enbridge,
"NEB Conditions," online: <www.gatewayfacts.ca/NEB-conditions/>), many of which call for
additional studies and plans.
90. Greenpeace, supra note I at paras 116, 247.
91. Ibidatpara247.
Environmental Assessment as Planning and Disclosure Tool: 227
Greenpeace v. Canada (A. G.)
law regime in Canada that project proponents must comply with.9 2 The
reality is that most environmental laws contain no generally applicable
substantive standard; rather, the legislation prohibits certain impacts in
one breath while granting departments a discretionary power to authorize
such impacts, often on an ad hoc basis, in the next.93
Section 35 of the Fisheries Act, arguably still one of Canada's most
important federal environmental laws, is a perfect example.94 In its current
form, section 3 5(1) prohibits works, undertakings, and activities that result
in the death of fish that are part of, or support, a commercial, recreational or
Aboriginal fishery, as well as those that result in the permanent alteration
92. The following line of questions from Robert Sopuck, the Conservative Party member for
Dauphin-Swan River, is illustrative: "I'd like to explore the distinction between environmental
process and actual environmental results on the ground. By results, I mean the chemistry and biology
of the environment itself. Ms. Schwartz, presumably any project that's planned these days takes
into account all the applicable statutes and regulations, like the Fisheries Act, SARA, the Migratory
Birds Convention Act, and the various provincial regulations. It goes without saying that those
standards are built into the project design, right?" Sopuck went on to suggest, "regardless of the
CEAA process, a project will be built with the highest environmental standards of the day. In terms
of environmental results, what is the value added of the CEAA process in terms of results?" To this,
Terry Toner, Director of Environmental Services for Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and the Chair
of the Canadian Electrical Association's stewardship task group, responded that "[i]n many cases,
as a project proceeds, there is some optionality that is part of what is brought forward, and often
the process can inform ... As a result of that, the process adds a lot of value": House of Commons,
Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, Evidence (1 November 2011)
(Chair: Mark Warawa) [emphasis added]. This "optionality" speaks to the discretionary nature of most
Canadian environmental laws; see infra note 93.
93. See e.g., David R Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 231 (observing that "[d]iscretion is one of the defining characteristics
of Canadian environmental law" pervading "almost every law, regulation and policy"); Bruce Pardy,
"In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem" (2005) 1 JSDLP
29 at 34-35 (observing that some environmental statutes, such as Ontario's Environmental Protection
Act, RSO 1990, c E 1§ , "include provisions that appear to be substantive rules of wide application,"
but which upon closer inspection allow "government administrators to make inexact policy decisions
that no one can predict ahead of time" and are marked by discretion).
94. The Fisheries Act, supra note 22 was recently amended as part of the 2012 omnibus budget
bills, formerly known as Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 (assented to 29 June
2012), SC 2012, c 19 and Bill C-45, A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget
tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012 (assented
to 14 December 2012), SC 2012, c 19. Most of the changes in those bills were viewed negatively
by various commentators: see, e.g., Meinhard Doelle, "CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA As We
Know It?" (2012) 24:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1; David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment:
Revitalizing Canadas Constitution (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) (describing recent federal changes
as "environmental rollbacks" at 150-151). However, commentators have since noted that DFO,
through its Fisheries and Oceans Canada, "Fisheries Protection Policy Statement", (Ottawa: DFO,
October 2012), online: <www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/pnw-ppe/pol/index-eng.html>, "does not view [the
amended regime] as being significantly different from [the previous one]": Janice Walton, Blakes,
Cassels & Graydon, "Fisheries Act Changes Effective November 25, 2013," online: <www.blakes.
comlEnglish/Resources/Bulletins/Pages/Details.aspx?BulletinID=1832#page=1>.
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to, or destruction of, their habitat.95 Subsection 35(2), however, goes on to
list a series of ways in which such works, etc. may be authorized, including
ministerial authorization. Nowhere in the legislative scheme is there any
clear limit on the amount of harm that the Minister may authorize; even the
recently introduced section 6 factors (which, consistent with the discussion
in the previous section, include the public interest) do not appear to dictate
any particular outcome.96
Nor, as noted by Russell J. in a remarkable portion of his decision
where he directly addressed the primary case law relied upon by the
respondents,97 do such schemes entail the qualification or quantification of
impacts in what is by comparison a relatively bright-line test, which is to
say significant versus non-significant effects under CEAA:
On the facts of this case, it is in my view not possible to know that the
potential effects in question "can and will be mitigated" to below the
level of significance (which the Court [in Express Pipelines] identified
at paragraph 10 as the "principal criterion" set by the statute) without
having some sense of what level of effect would be significant, which
is a decision for the s.-37 decision-makers. Where there is no available
standard or set of standards that can serve as a proxy for significance (and
the Panel has not pointed to one in this case with respect to hazardous
substance releases), in my view, those decision-makers must be provided
with information about the actual expected effects and the degree to
which they will be mitigated. In some cases (as in West Vancouver),
this analysis will be more qualitative, whereas other circumstances will
permit and call for a more quantitative approach, as I would argue is the
case here. In any case, where an effect is potentially significant, simply
stating that an unknown level of effect will be mitigated to another
unknown level is not sufficient to permit the s. 37 decision-makers to
discharge their responsibilities.9"
Russell J. also accepted the applicants' argument that there are important
procedural differences between the CEAA regime and other regulatory
processes.99 Returning again to section 35 of the Fisheries Act, there is
no formal role for public participation in the authorization process.
95. Fisheries Act, supra note 22, s 35.
96. Ibid, s 6(1): "Before [issuing a subsection 35(2) authorization] the Minister shall consider the
following factors: (a) the contribution of the relevant fish to the ongoing productivity of commercial,
recreational or Aboriginal fisheries; (b) fisheries management objectives; (c) whether there are
measures and standards to avoid, mitigate or offset serious harm to fish that are part of a commercial,
recreational or Aboriginal fishery, or that support such a fishery; and (d) the public interest." In fact,
the public interest has long been a primary factor in the implementation of the Fisheries Act: see
Comeaus Sea Foods Ltd v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [1997] 1 SCR 12 at para 37.
97. Greenpeace, supra note I at paras 338-357.
98. Ibidatpara355.
99. Ibidatpara230.
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Moreover, because the department does not maintain a public registry,
mere knowledge of any authorizations issued can only be gained through
access to information iequests. '00Thus, even though DFO and Environment
Canada are represented by ministers that are accountable to Parliament,
democratic accountability is exceedingly difficult where there is little or
no public knowledge of the ministers' decisions in the first place.
This reasoning applies equally to panel recommendations for further
studies, an approach that, as noted above, finds some support in Express
Pipelines. The problem with future studies is that these may reveal a
likelihood of significant adverse environmental effects after the political
decisions in relation to a project have been made. In addition to the
Darlington Panel Report, this issue is directly relevant to the Northern
Gateway Project and Panel Report. In a recent letter to the Prime Minister, 0'
over 300 scientists alleged that:
Northern Gateway omitted specified mitigation plans for numerous
environmental damages or accidents. This omission produced
fundamental uncertainties about the environmental impacts of Northern
Gateway's proposal (associated with the behaviour of bitumen in
saltwater, adequate dispersion modeling, etc.). The panel recognized these
fundamental uncertainties, but sought to remedy them by demanding the
future submission of plans.... Since these uncertainties are primarily
a product of omitted mitigation plans, such plans should have been
required and evaluated before the [Panel] report was issued. "2
In Greenpeace, Russell J. rightfully observed that the Express Pipelines
decision is a brief one that was delivered orally from the bench, such that
care was required "to avoid reading in principles that were not intended."' 10 3
Although Russell J. was satisfied of the consistency of his decision with
100. The author recently requested all section 35 authorizations issued by DFO (including supporting
material) from 1 September 2013 until May 2014. At the time of writing this comment, a letter from
the department's access to information office indicated that the request would take 720 days (2 years)
to process. Letter on file with author.
101. "Northern Gateway pipeline report 'flawed,' 300 scholars tell PM," CBC News (5 June, 2014),
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/>.
102. Whether or not the foregoing is an accurate characterization of the Panel's conclusions and
recommendations will no doubt be determined in the litigation already commenced with respect to that
report. It is worth nothing, however, that the letter's characterization of the environmental assessment
process as one intended to offer "guidance, both to concerned Canadians in forming their opinions
on the project and to the federal government in its official decision" (at 3) could have been written
by Russell J himself. See letter from Kai MA Chan et al to Stephen Harper, Prime Minister (26 May
2014), online:
<chanslab.ires.ubc.ca/files/2 014/05/JRP-Letter-to-Federal-GovtMay28_all-signaturesKCASET.
pdf> [emphasis added].
103. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 351.
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that case largely on the basis of his approach to judicial review, 104 some
additional comments on the topic of future studies are merited here.
The Federal Court of Appeal in Express Pipelines held that a "panel's
exercise is predictive and it is not surprising that the statute specifically
envisages the possibility of'follow-up' programmes."' ' 5 To suggest that the
presence of "follow-up programmes" supports putting off the assessment
of environmental effects, however, is to fundamentally misconceive what
such programs do and their place in the legislative scheme. As defined in
the Act, "follow-up programs" are for "(a) verifying the accuracy of the
environmental assessment of a designated project; and (b) determining
the effectiveness of any mitigation measures."'' 0 6 At the risk of stating the
obvious, there can be no verification without an initial assessment. Nor
can a follow-up program be designed for mitigation measures that have
yet to be specified.0 7
Finally, Russell J.'s concerns about short-circuiting have implications
for what the previous CEAA regime 10 8 recognized as a special kind of
follow-up program: adaptive management, reliance upon which has
become ubiquitous in the context of major resource projects in Canada.
Described in Greenpeace as a "counterbalance [to the precautionary
principle] to ensure that socially and economically desirable projects
can come to fruition,"'0 9 a more useful definition is the one used by the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency: "a planned and systematic
process for continuously improving environmental management practices
by learning about their outcomes.""0 The problem is that, as practiced
in Canada (and the United States and Australia for that matter), adaptive
management is rarely planned or systemic and serves primarily to excuse
an insufficient understanding of environmental effects, their mitigation,
104. Ibid at para 357.
105. Express Pipelines, supra note 38 at para 14.
106. See s 2 of CEAA 2012, supra note 9. See also CEAA 1992, supra note 3, s 2.
107. Bearing in mind also that "follow up program[s]" are among the factors to be considered in the
course of an environmental assessment: for CEAA 1992, supra note 3, see s 16(2)(c); for CEAA 2012,
supra note 9, see s 19(l)(e).
108. CEAA 1992, supra note 3, s 38(5): "The results of follow-up programs may be used for
implementing adaptive management measures or for improving the quality of future environmental
assessments." This singular reference to adaptive management in CEAA 1992 was not carried over to
CEAA 2012.
109. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 104.
110. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, "Adaptive Management Measures under the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act," Operational Policy Statement (Ottawa: CEAA, 13
September 2013), online: <www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=50139251-1>.
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or both.II' This not only makes learning and improvement impossible but,
as noted by the New Prosperity Review Panel roughly six months before
Greenpeace, such an approach also has the potential to "short-circuit"
CEAA's two-step decision making process:
[The proponent] declined to provide some materials requested by the
Panel and by other participants .... To deal with the resulting uncertainties,
the Panel considered various risk management strategies, including
adaptive management in some circumstances. However, when the Panel
concluded the potential adverse environmental effects were potentially
"significant," it did not agree that deferring decisions on the approach
to manage the risk to subsequent regulatory processes is appropriate.
It is necessary at the environmental assessment stage for the Panel to
determine if a significant adverse effect is likely and to consider if and
how the risk can be managed to acceptable levels." 2
Although none of the deficiencies in Greenpeace turned on this issue,
Russell J.'s analysis, combined with that of the New Prosperity Review
Panel, suggests that future proponents relying on adaptive management
should have much more detailed plans prepared than has historically been
the case.
3. Judicial review
a. The rebuttable presumption
As noted in the introduction, Russell J. held that the issues before him, which
included questions of law that were previously reviewed on a correctness
standard, were reviewable on the reasonableness standard pursuant to the
rebuttable presumption established in Dunsmuir. In my view, the roster-
like and non-permanent membership of CEAA panels is an important
consideration that may well be sufficient to rebut the presumption given
111. In Canada, see Arlene J Kwasniak, "Use and Abuse of Adaptive Management in Environmental
Assessment Law and Practice: A Canadian Example and General Lessons" (2010) 12:4 J Environmental
Assessment Policy & Management 425; Martin ZP Olszynski, "Adaptive Management in Canadian
Environmental Assessment Law: Exploring Uses and Limitations" (2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 1.
With respect to the US experience, see JB Ruh] & Robert L Fischman, "Adaptive Management in the
Courts" (2010) 95:2 Minn L Rev 424 at 441:
[A]gencies in practice have employed what we call 'a/m-lite,' a stripped down version of
adaptive management that almost always neglects to develop testable hypotheses as the basis
for management actions.., in its most extreme form, [it] is open-ended contingency planning
or 'on-the-fly' management that promises some loosely described response to whatever
circumstances arise.
For Australia, see most recently Jessica Lee, "Theory to Practice: Adaptive Management of the
Groundwater Impacts of Australian Mining Projects" (2014) 31 Environmental Planning LJ 251 at
251: "Despite its proliferation, there remains little consideration of what adaptive management means,
how it is faring in practice and what legal mechanisms are required for its effective implementation."
112. New Prosperity Panel Report, supra note 7 at 22 [emphasis added].
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the potential for inconsistent and potentially conflicting, but otherwise
reasonable, interpretations of the Act, a position that finds some support in
the Federal Court of Appeal's recent decision in Canada v. Kitselas First
Nation. 3
Several such inconsistent interpretations have arguably already arisen,
as in the case of the new standing rules under CEAA 2012. Through the
combined operation of subsections 2(2) and 43(1)(c), only those persons
deemed by a panel to be "interested parties," which is to say persons who
are either "directly affected by the carrying out of the designated project"
or have "relevant information or expertise" are to be granted the full suite
of participatory rights." 4 According to the Shell Jackpine Panel, these
provisions allow "a review panel to conduct an appropriately focused
project review.""' The New Prosperity Review Panel, on the other hand,
relied on the Supreme Court of Canada's then-recent decision in Canada
v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society,"6 to
adopt a "liberal and generous approach" to the standing requirements." 7
The practical difference was not that significant in these instances, both
panels granting standing to the vast majority of parties seeking it, but the
potential for divergent approaches is clearly there.
Another example is section 5 of CEAA 2012, which represents an
attempt to restrict the consideration of environmental effects to those
that fall within Parliament's legislative jurisdiction." 8 As with standing,
here again the Shell Jackpine Panel took a minimalist approach, simply
113. Canada v Kitselas First Nation, 2014 FCA 150 at para 34, 2014 CarswellNat 1858 (WL
Can). Admittedly, the nature of the legal issues in that case were of a higher, constitutional order,
but the following statement seems equally applicable to the CEAA context, as further set out below:
"Inconsistency.. would be unseemly and give rise to significant practical consequences."
114. CEAA 2012, supra note 9, s 2(2), 43(1 )(c).
115. Letter from Joint Review Panel to Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt LLP and to Individuals and
Groups-Regarding Interested Parties Participation in the Hearing and Presentation of New Evidence
(17 October 2012), online: <www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/documents/p59540/82626E.pdf>.
116. Canada (AG) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against liolence Society, 2012 SCC 45,
[2012] 2 SCR 524.
117. New Prosperity Panel Report, supra note 7 at 275-276:
Generally, "directly affected" refers to a personal interest that is distinct from the general
public interest in a matter. In the private law situation, a direct interest may arise from holding
property or other legal right that may be affected by a decision... .In public law cases, the
Court calls for a "liberal and generous" or "flexible" approach, guided by the purposes that
underlie the traditional limitations on standing designed to protect the efficient use of the
court's resources. When assessing whether a person is "directly affected" by a designated
project the Panel regards the situation to be closer to the public law situation because of the
purposes of the Act.
118. CEAA 2012, supra note 9, s 5(l),(2).
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declaring certain effects as falling within section 5,1'9 while the New
Prosperity Review Panel considered the issue very closely, observing that
"[t]here are many linkages between and among environmental changes,
including changes that are environmental effects defined under CEAA 2012
and those that are not," and which therefore require careful consideration
and categorization. 120
While it may be the case that there are compelling reasons to favour
different, regional approaches to the federal environmental assessment
regime, at the very least this is a case that needs to be made.
b. A green shade of reasonableness review?
Last but not least, Russell J.'s approach to reasonableness review merits
some discussion. While there are several important passages throughout
the decision, the following is fairly representative of the whole:
To repeat what is stated above, because of its unique role in the statutory
scheme, a review panel is required to do more than consider the evidence
and reach a reasonable conclusion. It must provide sufficient analysis and
justification to allow the s. 37 decision-makers to do the same, based on
a broader range of scientific and public policy considerations. One could
say that the element of "justification, transparency and intelligibility
within the decision-making process" takes on a heightened importance
in this context.' 2'
In my view, this is precisely the kind of approach that Justice Binnie had in
mind when he stated in Khosa that "[r]easonableness is a single standard
that takes its colour from the context." 22 In the environmental assessment
context, this means striking a balance between panels' expertise, which
clearly commands deference, and their role in a democratically accountable
decision-making process.
That panels' conclusions are entitled to deference is well established.
Probably the clearest articulation of what their expertise requires in terms
of deference can be found in Tremblay-Lamer J.'s decision in Pembina
Institute:
I am fully aware of the level of expertise possessed by the Panel. The
record shows that they had ample material before them.. .and thus any
articulated conclusions drawn from the evidence should be accorded a
high measure of deference. However, this deference to expertise is only
119. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Report of the Joint Review Panel Shell Canada
Energy Jackpine Mine Expansion Project, (Ottawa: CEAA, 9 July 2013) at paras 38-39.
120. New Prosperity Panel Report, supra note 7 at 21.
121. Greenpeace, supra note 1 at para 272 [citations omitted].
122. Canada (Citizenship andImmigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59, [2009] 1 SCR 339.
234 The Dalhousie Law Journal
triggered when those conclusions are articulated. Instructively, in Canada
(Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam
Inc.,.. at para. 62, lacobucci J. cited with approval the following excerpt
from Kerans, R. P., Standards of Review Employed by Appellate Courts,
p. 17 which dealt with deference to "expertise":
Experts, in our society, are called that precisely because they can
arrive at well-informed and rational conclusions. If that is so, they
should be able to explain, to a fair-minded but less well-informed
observer, the reasons for their conclusions. If they cannot, they are
not very expert .... That said, it seems obvious that [appellate courts]
manifestly must give great weight to cogent views thus articulated.'23
Thus, deference to expertise is not unlimited-it requires "the cogent
articulation of the rationale basis for conclusions reached.' 24 Were it
otherwise, there would arguably be no need for panel reports to be made
public, or panel reports at all for that matter. Rather, environmental
assessment legislation embodies the idea that science must not only be
done, but must also be seen to be done. 125
123. Pembina Institute, supra note 40 at para 75 [emphasis in original; citations omitted].
124. Ibid.
125. This brings us to another widely-quoted but also misunderstood passage with respect to judicial
review in the environmental assessment context: Strayer J's admonition in Vancouver Island Peace
Society v Canada, [1992] 3 FC 42 (TD) that courts are not to become "an academy of science" (at para
12) (see, e.g., Greenpeace, supra note I at para 23). What all of the case law neglects to mention is the
very specific (if not peculiar) procedural context in which this phrase was written. The case involved
the application of the EARPGO (supra note 11) to visiting nuclear powered naval vessels. The federal
government applied to have the Society's judicial review converted into an action because, in its view,
there would be "many difficult issues of fact to be determined as to whether there are 'significant'
'potentially adverse environmental effects' (at para 3), implying that it was "the responsibility of the
Court to sit on appeal from the factual determinations of the 'initiating department" (at para 5). It is
this role that Strayer J rightfully rejected in this case, which becomes clear when one considers the
relevant passage in its entirety:
For these reasons I am unsympathetic to the [Government's] arguments...that there are
difficult technical factual determinations to be made which will require pleadings and
a trial and the cross-examination viva voce of experts and others. It is not the role of
the Court in these proceedings to become an academy of science to arbitrate conflicting
scientific predictions, or to act as a kind of legislative upper chamber to weigh expressions
of public concern and determine which ones should be respected.... [These] are not the
roles conferred upon it in the exercise of judicial review under section 18 of the Federal
Court Act.
While "academy of science" is obviously a strong turn of phrase, it is equally clear that Strayer J
was reacting to an extreme proposition and that this decision should not be understood as precluding
substantive inquiry into the EA process; as noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Inverhuron &
District Ratepayers Assn v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2001 FCA 203, 39 CELR (NS)
161, to do so "would risk turning the right to judicial review...into a hollow one." As for institutional
capacity, one need only consider the federal courts' intellectual property jurisprudence, and that
surrounding Canada's patented medicine regime in particular (under the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133) to see that federal judges are perfectly capable of digesting
complex scientific evidence.
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Even this limitation, however, does not capture the full story. A given
panel may well be able to explain why it has confidence in a subsequent
regulator's ability to manage environmental effects (e.g., it has a good
reputation based on a solid track record), which might even be sufficient
for ensuring "sound decision-making," but if it fails to actually assess
a project's effects the report would still be deficient.126 The issue here is
not one of expertise but rather of accountability. Panels set the stage for
democratic accountability, a stage that will differ dramatically depending
on whether a panel concludes that a project is or is not likely to result in
significant adverse environmental effects. 127
Finally, expertise and accountability are inter-related. While a finding
that a project is not likely to result in significant adverse environmental
effects is obviously the most politically useful, even where the news is
bad (i.e., such effects are likely) the mere fact of the process appears to
have some political value. With respect to Northern Gateway, for example,
which has been deemed likely to result in significant adverse environmental
effects, the Prime Minister and then Minister of Natural Resources Joe
Oliver have been reported as saying that they will "make a decision only
after considering the recommendations of the 'fact-based' and 'scientific'
review panel."' 28 Mr. Oliver also released a statement where he described
the panel's report as "a rigorous, open and comprehensive science-based
assessment."129
In this context, the role of a reviewing court should be to ensure the
integrity of a process that government predictably and-where it has been
adequately followed-justifiably relies on to gain support for its political
decisions. Russell J.'s approach to reasonableness review in Greenpeace
appears to have done just that.
Conclusion
Over two decades ago, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Friends of the Oldman River'30 entrenched environmental assessment as
a planning tool and as an integral part of sound decision-making. There
126. Greenpeace, supra note I at para 280.
127. Tremblay-Lamer J appears to have recognized this in Pembina Institute, supra note 40 at para 74
[emphasis added], when she wrote: "Should the Panel determine that the proposed mitigation measures
are incapable of reducing the potential adverse environmental effects of a project to insignificance, it
has a duty to say so as well."
128. Shawn McCarthy, Gloria Galloway & Brent Jang, "Panel's approval for Northern Gateway
sets stage for PM's pipeline battle," The Globe and Mail (23 December 2013), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com>.
129. "Northern Gateway pipeline recommended for federal approval, with conditions," CBC News
(19 December 2013), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/>.
130. Friends of the Oldman River, supra note 6.
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have been several developments since that time but Greenpeace is the
first decision to explicitly recognize and give meaning to the public
role in the environmental assessment process. The first such role is
during the environmental assessment itself, which Russell J. rightly held
requires that environmental effects be sufficiently assessed so as to make
meaningful public participation possible. 3 ' The second role is at the end
of the process, at which time not only political decision makers but also
the public will form their views about the desirability (or not) of a given
project. This role also requires that panels actually consider the potential
adverse environmental effects of a project and whether these are likely to
be significant. In this context, the role of a reviewing court is to ensure the
integrity of the environmental assessment process, which in turn serves
the process of democratic accountability that the CEAA was intended to
create.
131. For a good overview of the theories underlying public participation in the environmental
assessment process itself, see Shaun Fluker, "The Right to Public Participation in Resources and
Environmental Decision-Making in Alberta" (2015) 52:3 Alta L Rev 567.
